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Abstract: Three prominent research programs in cognitive psychology would benefit from a 
stronger engagement with the cultural context of cognition: studies of poverty focused on 
scarcity and cognitive bandwidth (CB); of the dual-process model of moral judgment (DPM); 
and of biases using the implicit association test (IAT). We address the blind spots common to 
these programs and suggest research strategies for moving beyond an exclusive focus on 
cognition. Research on poverty using the CB approach would benefit from considering the 
cultural schemas that influence how people perceive and prioritize needs. DPM researchers could 
explain variation by analysing cultural repertoires that structure moral choices. Research using 
the IAT can better explain implicit attitudes by addressing the variability in cultural schemas that 
undergird biases. We identify how these research programs can deepen the causal understanding 
of human attitudes and behaviours by addressing the interaction between internal cognition and 
supra-individual cultural repertoires. 
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 In recent years, social scientists have increasingly turned to individual cognitive 
processes to explain social phenomena. Three prominent manifestations of this trend are the 
study of poverty focused on scarcity and cognitive bandwidth (CB); the dual-process model of 
moral judgment (DPM), which describes how moral judgment differs between automatic and 
reflective thought; and the study of people’s attitudes through implicit association tests (IAT). 
Each yields important insights into complex social processes. CB provides a cognitive 
explanation for why low-income people make decisions that extend their poverty. DPM uncovers 
the psychological processes that produce puzzling patterns of moral judgments. IAT reveals 
otherwise unobservable biases that can lead to discrimination. 
 As each line of work has gained extraordinary prominence in academic and policy 
discussions, they deserve close examination. Building on behavioural economics, the CB model 
has led policymakers to mobilize psychological “nudges” to achieve specific goals, such as 
helping the poor save money. DPM has contributed to the proliferation of programs in “Mind, 
Brain and Behaviour” and business ethics across American universities. Over 14 million people 
have taken IATs and the method has been adopted by employers, such as Google and the 
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Chicago Police Department, as a tool for promoting inclusion by attuning participants to their 
own biases. While much differentiates these three lines of work, which range from an integrated 
research programs to a wide-ranging body of research mobilizing a common tool, they share a 
relative prominence, focus on cognition, and aspiration to explain important social phenomena. 
 These influential approaches also have a common limitation: each explains judgments 
and behaviours by cognition alone, skirting the cultural background that makes some cognitive 
referents more available or salient than others 1–3. In focusing on universal cognitive processes, 
they present culturally specific worldviews as universal or natural. To explain meaningful 
variations in judgment and behaviour across groups, these approaches must consider the group-
level cultural repertoires that undergird cognition. Specifically, we propose that universal 
cognitive processes are shaped by the specific cultural repertoires provided by the social 
environment, which vary between crosscutting social groups. Stronger causal explanations can 
thus be produced by bridging research on cognition with cultural sociology. 
 Building on Emile Durkheim’s work on classification systems, cultural sociologists have 
emphasized “cultural repertoires,” defined as the available schemas, frames, narratives, scripts, 
and boundaries that actors draw on in social situations (for definitions, see Lamont and Small 4). 
This influential model of culture diverges from older models that implied cultural homogeneity 
within groups, such as those bound by common national membership 5. In a classic paper, 
Swidler emphasized the pragmatic use of meanings and symbols in everyday life, arguing that 
“culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented 
but by shaping a repertoire or ‘tool-kit’ of habits, skills, and styles” 6. The concept of cultural 
repertoires thus emphasizes the heterogeneity of cultural tools; the varying availability of these 
tools between cross-cutting groups such as those defined by nationhood, gender, ethnicity, age, 
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or class; and the non-deterministic character of cultural tool-kits, which enable and constrain 
rather than prescribing patterns of thought and behaviour. 
 Subsequent research has examined why actors use some cultural tools instead of others. 
Social environments provide people with specific meanings: the social world is suffused with 
symbolic systems—ranging from national myths like the American dream to scripts about gender 
role—which are diffused by intermediaries ranging from religious groups and the media to 
scientific and legal experts, making specific cultural referents more or less salient to members of 
different social groups. For instance, Lamont and Thévenot 7 show that people in the United 
States are more likely to make evaluations based on economic criteria, while in France, referents 
about civic solidarity and aesthetics are more common. At the sub-national level, literature on 
institutional logics examines variation in the salience of schemas, frames, narratives, and 
boundaries across organizations, classes, and occupations (e.g., Thornton, Ocasio, and 
Lounsbury 8). Still others show how cultural tools become available to different groups: young 
working class men in the UK learn to perform masculine identity in class-specific ways through 
interactions at school 9; and American women learn to behave in accordance with “intensive 
mothering” in response to the diffusion of gendered ideologies via child-rearing books 10. This 
literature often draws on interviews, but it does not assume that self-reports reflect behaviour; 
instead it aims to document the relative salience of these repertoires 7. Such work shows that 
differently structured social environments make some cultural referents more readily available to 
individuals than others. Such cultural meanings, in turn, can shape individual cognition. 
 This literature complements the path-breaking work of cultural psychologists who have 
examined the cultural foundation of individual cognition, often using data from other societies to 
challenge universalist assumptions in mainstream psychology (e.g., Buchtel et al. 11; Cole 12; 
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Markus and Kitayama 13; and Shweder et al. 14). While cultural psychologists demonstrate 
national, regional, and class variations (e.g., Stephens, Markus, and Phillips 15), they often 
assume cultural homogeneity within groups or societies and are less concerned with identifying 
why some schemas more readily available than others. Our objective differs from that of cultural 
psychologists in that we offer new empirical insight into unexplained sources of variation by 
foregrounding causes of cultural heterogeneity (e.g., Lamont et al. 16). 
 Because cultural repertoires include schemas that structure the valuation of scarce 
resources, widely shared concepts of morality, and the stigmatization of groups, research in CB, 
DPM, and IAT would benefit from a deeper engagement with cultural variation. By addressing 
the cultural repertoires through which groups think, feel, and act, these research programs can 
enrich the understanding of why the universal cognitive processes posited by CB, DPM, and IAT 
produce particular patterns of judgments and behaviours in specific contexts. 
 Table 1 summarizes the three approaches, the consequences of narrowly focusing on 
individual cognition, and propositions for integrating the study of universal cognition and 
cultural repertoires. The latter enable the very categories needed to conceptualize the study of 
poverty, morality, and discrimination: in CB, the idea that some resources are particularly 
valuable; in DPM, the idea that people engage in certain styles of moral evaluations; and in IAT, 
the idea of group difference. By ignoring variations in cultural background, these approaches can 
yield inaccurate predictions about responses to scarcity, lead to misguided prescriptions for 
moral reasoning, and prevent researchers from distinguishing between evaluation and salience of 
categories in implicit bias. 
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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 In the next sections, we turn to the main argument of the three literatures, what they miss, 
and how to build bridges between universal cognition and cultural repertoires. We conclude by 
offering preliminary proposals for building an analytical bridge with cultural sociology. 
 
THE COGNITIVE BANDWIDTH MODEL 
 Scholars have long debated why the poor so often remain in poverty. Culture of poverty 
arguments, which suggest that the poor are inhibited by deviant values or habits 17, have fallen 
out of favour 4. However, social scientists recognize that the poor often make decisions that 
prolong or deepen their disadvantage. The “cognitive bandwidth” approach provides new 
insights into cognitive processes underlying these behaviours by examining decision-making in 
the context of scarcity. The universal cognitive processes it identifies reveal commonalities 
between the poor and the middle class that help readers understand apparently irrational 
behaviour. Without investigating the diverse cultural repertoires that structure cognition, 
however, the model is insufficient to explain actual behaviour in specific contexts. 
 In Scarcity 18 and related articles (e.g., Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 19; Mani et al. 
20), economist Sendhil Mullainathan and psychologist Eldar Shafir propose that when people feel 
they have insufficient time, money, or food, they focus exclusively on managing the scarce 
resource. This heightened focus, or “tunnelling,” has benefits: by ignoring irrelevant issues, we 
make better use of cognitive capacities to solve the focal problem, yielding a “focus dividend.” 
People with scarce resources are more economically rational with regard to the specific scarce 
resource than those with abundant resources 21. 
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 This tunnelling, however, reduces the amount of cognitive “bandwidth” available for 
other concerns, creating new problems. For the poor, the pressing need to focus on short-term 
economic requirements inhibits long-term planning, leading to future scarcity; tunnelling thus 
becomes not only an effect but also a cause of poverty. For the businessman with scarce time to 
meet work deadlines, tunnelling will lead him to neglect his family: “projects must be finished 
now; the children will be there tomorrow” 18. 
 The cognitive bandwidth model helps explain routine non-optimal decision-making, 
drawing parallels between the cash-strapped poor and the time-strapped middle class to highlight 
the universal effects of scarcity on cognition. But the model is limited by the assumption that 
there is universal agreement about which resources are most essential. In fact, people often 
experience multiple simultaneous forms of scarcity. This is particularly true among the poor, for 
whom health problems, economic insecurity, housing instability, and violence frequently 
coincide 22. 
 In presuming that economic scarcity is always the most salient to the poor, CB research 
risks labelling as “non-optimal” behaviours that enable survival in specific contexts. In both rural 
India and the US, poor people spend scarce money on social functions like celebrations 23 or 
funerals 24, because the social cost of failing to contribute outweighs competing economic 
considerations. Similarly, in the hypothetical but intuitive example of the busy working father, it 
might seem obvious that work demands are more urgent than family demands. But this 
interpretation relies on a particular set of cultural interpretations: specific scripts of fatherhood, 
frames that distinguish “work life” from “family life,” and narratives linking self-worth to 
economic success. 
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 Research shows, however, that cultural repertoires vary across social groups, such that 
which problem takes priority during tunnelling is not obvious. Our intuitive expectation for the 
businessman may be different if the working parent were a woman. Even among men, Waller 25 
has demonstrated that non-resident low-income fathers frequently repurpose the concept of “the 
provider” to emphasize emotional presence over material resources, suggesting that men 
prioritize family time in certain circumstances. While the cognitive process of “tunnelling” may 
take place under conditions of scarcity, without considering the role of cultural repertoires in 
structuring the perception of scarcity and the evaluation of competing scarce resources, we 
cannot develop a causal understanding of decision-making. 
 By incorporating cultural repertoires, CB research can develop a richer model of how the 
poor or the middle class perceive, evaluate, and respond to situations of scarcity. Hierarchies of 
concern are far from universal; culturally available frames influence which of several competing 
needs takes priority to become the object of “tunnelling.” As CB influences the design of policy 
interventions directed at poor communities (e.g., Daminger et al. 26), we risk implementing anti-
poverty interventions detrimental to material, social, and cultural well-being by not considering 
what specific groups value and why. 
 
Bringing Culture In 
 The CB approach can develop more accurate models of decision-making by addressing 
cultural variations. We adopt the view that the poor do not “have” a culture that explains their 
poverty; rather people living in poverty “use and create symbols” that give meaning to their 
context and inform strategies of action 4. Our proposal, therefore, is that studies of decision-
making under scarcity consider cultural repertoires available in a given social context to enrich 
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the understanding of how people perceive and evaluate their needs. Where the CB model makes 
assumptions about the perception and prioritization of scarce resource, it will overlook ways in 
which apparently non-optimal behaviour, in fact, responds skilfully to the specific priorities of 
individuals and groups. 
 Rosen 27 studied why residents of poor neighbourhoods decide to move, although 
moves—typically costly—are mostly “horizontal,” between neighbourhoods similar in terms of 
safety and poverty. In unsafe neighbourhoods, residents construct narratives of safety to 
“emphasize their own ability to cope” 27. When they can maintain these narratives, they typically 
remain in place—even in the face of real threats. When events disrupt their narrative 
frameworks, they often move—even if moving provides no actual improvement in safety. This 
work demonstrates that cultural repertoires shape prioritization: where we might expect poor 
residents to prioritize urgent economic demands, respondents take on the cost of moving because 
narratives of safety are more pressing than economic concerns. Narratives thus determine which 
resource becomes the focus of tunnelling. That “tunnelling” on safety does not yield more 
“rational” outcomes with respect to this scarce resource raises the question of whether the CB 
model’s “focus dividend” applies equally to non-economic resources. 
 In the world of professionals, Blair-Loy’s study of women finance executives 28 shows 
that repertoires inform prioritization of multiple scarce resources for women balancing work and 
family. She identifies inductively a “work devotion schema,” traditionally associated with men, 
which demands dedication of time and loyalty to the career; and a “family devotion schema,” 
which demands that women prioritize family and home above all. Such schemas change over 
time: older cohorts are more likely to accept the irreconcilability of these demands and abstain 
from childrearing, while younger cohorts rearticulate the family devotion schema to enable the 
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coexistence of commitments. Blair-Loy highlights the gendered cultural repertoires underlying 
the tendency posited by Mullainathan and Shafir for a hypothetical father to “tunnel” on work 
instead of family. It also demonstrates the evolution of repertoires in response to changing social 
conditions. 
 These studies suggest that causal understanding of decision-making can be improved by 
considering empirical findings from cultural sociology in field and experimental studies of 
decision-making under scarcity. Drawing on the literature documenting cultural repertoires, 
researchers can identify additional explanations for existing findings. For instance, economic 
sociologist Zelizer and colleagues 29 highlight the multiple meanings of money to argue that 
behavioural economists should regard the significance of economic maximization as highly 
variable. Future research should clarify causal mechanisms by gathering data about the existence 
and evaluation of multiple forms of scarcity. For instance, in field studies, scholars can specify 
the effect of scarcity on cognition using questions that variably highlight economic, familial, 
safety, moral, or health related resources. 
 Cultural sociologists, for their part, can take inspiration from CB research to investigate 
the meanings attached to diverse scarce resources and how they structure variations in behaviour. 
Daniel 30, for instance, shows that low-income parents hesitate to introduce new foods to their 
children because the repeated trials required to acclimate children to new tastes are costly. Where 
low-income parents see rejected food as an economic loss, higher-income respondents frame this 
as an experiential gain. This work demonstrates the opportunities for cultural sociologists to 





 Psychologists have long debated whether intuition or reasoning drives moral decisions 31–
33. Over the last decade, a group of moral psychologists answered this question with their 
research program on dual-process morality (DPM), which suggests that moral judgments and 
decisions are shaped by the interaction between two distinct cognitive processes: one fast, 
unconscious, and automatic; the other slow, reflective, and effortful 34,35. 
 Much of this work analyses responses to hypothetical scenarios like the classic “Trolley 
Problem”: a runaway trolley is about to kill five people; the only way to save them is to pull a 
switch directing the trolley to another track where one person, instead of the five, will be killed. 
In a variant called the “footbridge” version, the respondent contemplates pushing another person 
wearing a heavy backpack off a footbridge in front of the trolley to stop it from killing the five. 
Research, mostly with American and European participants, shows that while the majority of 
people approve of pulling the switch, only a minority considers pushing the backpacker morally 
acceptable 36. 
 DPM researchers argue that the automatic process is driven by deep-rooted intuitions that 
associate violent acts—such as pushing someone off a bridge—with strong negative affect, 
thereby producing judgments aligned with deontological principles designating the act of killing 
as fundamentally wrong regardless of its consequences. In contrast, they argue, reflective 
cognition performs rational analysis of consequences and tends to produce utilitarian judgments, 
according to which it is morally permissible to sacrifice one to save many (e.g., Bartels and 
Pizarro 37; Conway and Gawronski 38; Cushman, Young, and Hauser 39). 
 Judgments and decisions depend on the relative strength of the output of the two systems 
35,39, which can be changed with selective interventions in experimental settings. A heavy 
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cognitive load (produced by asking a subject to engage in a distracting memorization task, for 
instance) consumes cognitive resources and makes people more likely to uphold their 
deontological principles 40. In contrast, brain-lesion patients with dampened emotions exhibit 
exceptionally high levels of utilitarian judgments 35. Business ethics programs thus draw on 
DPM, aiming to reduce ethical transgressions by encouraging people to shift between automatic 
and reflective thinking (see, for example, the “Ethics Unwrapped” program at the University of 
Texas at Austin and the “Behavioural Ethics” Symposium held at Harvard Business School). 
 DPM research increasingly predefines specific schemas, frames, discourses, and 
categorization systems undergirding moral judgments as natural or universal. This is apparent in 
the taken-for-granted association of “utilitarian judgment” with reflective cognition, and of 
“deontological judgment” with automatic cognition. Moreover, the negative affective responses 
produced by automatic processes in reaction to harming others (such as pushing another person 
off a bridge) are described as the natural result of evolution that promoted the species’ chances of 
survival, while the “utilitarian” tendency to tolerate harm to one person to save five others is 
naturalized as universal human rationality 36,41,42. Yet, no empirical evidence of such associations 
is provided. 
 While the dual process structure of moral cognition may well be universal, the specific 
kinds of judgments that automatic and reflective processes produce—and when they are at odds 
with one another—are shaped by cultural repertoires about morality. Naturalizing particular 
moral discourses limits DPM researchers’ ability to describe and explain variations in moral 
judgments across contexts. For example, Xiang 43 found that Tibetan Buddhist monks and lay 
Tibetans overwhelmingly give “utilitarian responses” even in the more emotionally disturbing 
footbridge version. DPM cannot convincingly account for such variations because it does not 
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consider the life worlds of diverse respondents and the cultural context of moral choices. 
Without analysing the latter, it may be ineffectual and even risky to promote shifting the balance 
of moral evaluation between automatic and reflective cognition as a means to reduce moral 
conflicts or transgressions. One need not look beyond moral psychology and behavioural ethics 
to realize that moral intuitions are not necessarily deontological and moral reflection is not 
necessarily utilitarian, particularly outside the pool of WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialized 
Rich Democratic) participants 44,45. 
 
Bringing Culture In 
 To understand the socially and culturally contingent nature of findings from DPM 
research, we must attend to cultural repertoires about morality—the moral schemas, 
categorizations, and discourses undergirding our moral judgments and behaviours, or what 
Abend 2 refers to as “moral background,” which acts as the very foundation enabling assertions 
of goodness. The intractability of the trolley dilemma is based on particular cultural schemas: the 
idea of an objective “greater good”—measured in the number of lives saved—which serves as 
the basis of evaluating the moral acceptability of an action, and the categorization of the 
(imagined) action of pushing a person off a footbridge—even if unconsciously—as “violence,” 
“killing,” or “inflicting severe harm.” While these particular schemas are commonplace in many 
Western societies, they are not always and equally present, nor are they the only ones available. 
 Documenting the empirical cultural repertoires that prevail in the context of moral 
decision-making could provide more compelling explanations for how universal cognitive 
processes produce different patterns of moral judgment across contexts. Tibetan may react 
differently to the trolley dilemma than American respondents because they draw on different 
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repertoires. Indeed, Xiang 43 shows that Americans talk about “rights” or “better results” when 
accounting for their preference—consistent with the utilitarian-deontology dichotomy—while 
Tibetans cite stories from Buddhist sutras to justify using “compassionate intention” to evaluate 
the moral goodness of an act, referring to moral categories distinctive to Tibetan Buddhism such 
as “karma,” “sacrifice,” and “the heart of a Buddha/bodhicitta” (also Flanagan 46). Some of the 
monks argued that pushing the backpacker off the bridge to save others is regarded as morally 
permissible, or even honorable, if this is done purely out of compassion for the would-be victims 
without any selfish intentions (such as personal animus towards the backpacker or personal 
affection for any of the would-be victims lying on the track). This case provides evidence of 
diversity in moral schemas and logics that DPM researchers miss, including schemas antithetical 
to the utilitarian and deontological principles taken for granted by this line of research. 
Moreover, an understanding of cultural repertoires is thus crucial to developing the prescriptive 
implications of DPM research for resolving moral conflicts or reducing ethical transgressions. 
Before asking people to shift from automatic to reflective mode or vice versa, researchers should 
consider the schemas and logics that structure moral intuitions and moral reasoning in a 
particular social group. 
 Studies of diverse moral judgments and behaviours suggest that scholars can enrich DPM 
research by integrating empirical findings from cultural sociology into future studies. To test the 
universality of the dominant schema, DPM scholars can record explanations of responses to 
hypothetical scenarios and analyse the alignment with the utilitarian-deontology dichotomy. 
Rather than relying on moral dilemmas from Western moral philosophers such as the Trolley 
Problem, they could design a variety of moral dilemmas highlighting alternative moral principles 
documented or analysed by sociologists (e.g., varying frames about moral worth among French 
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and Americans described in Lamont 47,48; also Boltanski and Thévenot 49; different moral 
narratives of political conservatives and liberals examined in McAdams et al. 50), anthropologists 
(e.g., different assumptions about other actors’ moral intentions discussed in Keane 51), 
philosophers (e.g., the contrast between Confucian, Buddhist, and Western moral discourses 
presented in Flanagan 46), and other moral psychologists (e.g. the diversity of moral intuitions 
described in Haidt’s 33 Social Intuitionist Model. 
 Cultural sociologists can also contribute by collecting data on how individuals interpret 
situations—data often dismissed as post-hoc rationalizations by cognitive psychologists 52—to 
develop inductive insights into the cultural tools used by diverse respondents in moral situations. 
By bridging cognitive psychology and cultural analysis, scholars can foreground the often taken-
for-granted cultural repertoires that structure automatic or reflective cognition, thus enabling 
DPM to build more robust causal connections between cognitive processes and patterns of moral 
decisions in the real world. Beyond the individual moral judgment, scholars can furthermore 
investigate how certain moral schemas, logics, or scripts become “intuitive” or default formulas 
for moral judgment, pointing the way to strategies for resolving moral conflicts or reduce ethical 
transgression. 
 
THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST 
 First introduced by Greenwald and colleagues in 1998, the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) has emerged as one of the most widely used measures of implicit attitudes. Because of its 
capacity to detect biases that are difficult to capture through self-reporting, it quickly diffused 
beyond psychology 53,54 and is now widely used in diversity trainings in both the public and 
private sectors. 
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 The IAT analyses a subject’s automatic evaluations of an object or a person based on the 
idea of “differential association” 55, which is assessed by measuring the time that respondents 
take to associate the visual representation of items (e.g., faces representing race or gender) with 
evaluations of certain kinds (e.g., good or bad). The matching times between items and 
evaluative categories predict the existence of an implicit bias or preference vis-à-vis the 
classified item: the longer the matching time, the more likely it is that there is a bias towards the 
item. 
 The method has been subjected to scrutiny, primarily on three grounds: the validity of the 
test, the degree to which it predicts discriminatory behaviour, and the receptivity of implicit 
biases to different types of interventions. While IAT is the object of considerable controversy 
among organizational psychologists 56 and social psychologists 57, as well as in the popular press 
58, the consensus is that it outperforms other indirect measures of biases in terms of internal 
validity 54,59. In contrast, the debate over the predictive validity of the IAT is not resolved 57: 
Some argue that IAT results are correlated with discriminatory behaviour 60,61; others claim that 
the IAT has limited capacity to predict discrimination 56,57. Finally, scholars disagree about 
whether implicit biases are immune to outside stimulus 62. 
 Regardless of where they stand on these debates, IAT researchers collectively focus on 
internal cognitive processes to explain attitudes and judgments, rather than addressing the role of 
cultural repertoires in structuring bias. They implicitly frame cognition as static—concerning 
“warm” feelings toward groups for instance—precluding consideration of changes in bias over 
time or across context.For example, they do not take into account the national variations in the 
stigmatization of blacks 16. Their static understanding of cultural scripts is also reflected in their 
methods of “counterbalancing”: IAT researchers attempt to limit the impact of what they regard 
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to be a ‘universal norm against darker skin’ by simply using grey pixels to represent African 
American. 
 Though some acknowledge that the outside environment shapes biases 63, IAT 
researchers typically operationalize context in rather limited ways. For instance, the test available 
on the Project Implicit website (the most prominent IAT website) incorporates only a few factors 
such as the respondent’s zip code 64. The online test asks respondents to provide information 
about socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., date of birth, race, ethnicity, gender, and political 
identity), but does not collect data on contextual factors that are likely to bear on the nature of 
biases, such as the frequency of interaction with groups presented in the test (e.g., the number of 
minorities living in one’s neighbourhood) or the extent to which an ethno-racial group is 
stigmatized in the subject’s environment. Not factoring in important information about available 
cultural repertoires limits IAT researchers’s capacity to understand the social meaning of implicit 
bias. 
 
Bringing Culture in 
 Neglecting the cultural repertoires that undergird cognitive processes has important 
consequences. One of them is that, IAT research cannot specify the meaning of differential 
associations. Most importantly, researchers cannot determine whether the speed of association 
between image and word categories is due to a positive and negative evaluation, or to relative 
exposure and familiarity. For instance, faster association between “good/bad” and President 
Obama—as compared to Ronald Reagan—is interpreted as revealing a like or dislike. Yet, it 
could simply reflect the higher salience of Obama in today’s media (see Matthews 65 for more 
details on salience). Information about prior exposure to cultural repertoires is required to 
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determine whether a shorter association time is due to the lack of exposure to the designated item 
or the actual reflection of a bias against it. 
 Documenting predominant schemas can help IAT scholars to disentangle results due to 
salience and those resulting from evaluation. Cognitive psychologists could incorporate data 
about attitudes toward, and prior exposure to, specific groups based on the network-based 
questions found in surveys like the General Social Survey in order to assess salience due to prior 
exposure that comes from network diversity. Historical and qualitative studies of changes in the 
stigmatization of groups could also inform the interpretations of IAT results: studies 
documenting the stigmatization of obesity 66 can be used to point scholars to relevant questions 
about the respondent’s prior awareness of and disposition towards this group. Interdisciplinary 
collaboration could further improve research, building on the work of social psychologists who 
examine how socially constructed logics prompt internal cognitive processes. For instance, 
Stephens and colleagues 15 examine how “an intervention might teach students about the 
assumptions embedded in the university culture.” While cultural sociologists can better 
understand how culture works by considering automatic cognition in their own analyses 67, we 
propose that collaboration would also benefit IAT researchers, providing opportunities to refine 
their findings and the interpretations of their results. By taking into account cultural schemas in a 
more systematic manner, researchers using the IAT can open the black box of evaluative 
procedure to the benefit of psychologists and sociologists alike. 
 A more systematic inclusion of cultural repertoires in IAT studies could also have 
important effects for the practitioners who have been using the test to promote workplace 
inclusion. Addressing discrimination within organizations may require transforming durable 
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institutional scripts rather than relying on the repeated administration of IATs in diversity 
training, which has been show to have limited effect or unintended negative results 68. 
 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE AGENDA 
 Engagement with the cultural repertoires that structure human judgment and behaviours 
would enrich the research areas we discussed here. Each literature assumes an ahistorical or 
“natural” set of cultural referents, which is contradicted by research that demonstrates cultural 
variation shaped by complex socio-cultural pathways. While space limitations prevent a full 
review of relevant pathways, our discussion has focused on how cultural repertoires influence 
evaluation and decision-making. To develop more complete causal models and accurately 
interpret results, it is imperative that we build stronger bridges between cognitive psychology 
and studies of cultural repertoires. 
 What are the consequences of neglecting cultural variation for the tasks these fields 
define for themselves? Without considering how the poor prioritize multiple scarce resources, 
the CB model cannot offer causal explanations for decisions, given the many overlapping scarce 
resources defining poverty. Dual-process moral cognition aims to understand the universal 
structures of moral judgment but relies on culturally specific moral schemas, such that its 
predictions for moral decision-making apply only to individuals whose cultural repertoires match 
those baked into the model. Without investigating varying degrees to which groups are 
stigmatized, IAT scholars cannot fully interpret their results and distinguish between variations 
resulting from salience and evaluation. Interdisciplinary collaboration could yield a more 
accurate understanding of the cognitive dimensions of poverty, ethics, and discrimination. 
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 The social sciences have been moving away from a radical opposition between emic 
studies of culture “in the wild” and lab experiments. Following DiMaggio 69, Zerubavel 70, and 
others, cultural sociologists are building a bridge toward cognitive science by incorporating the 
dual-process model of cognition 71, embodiment 72, networks 73, implicit bias 74, and emotions 
into cultural sociology. Shepherd 67 in particular has considered the impact of symbols and 
media, place, situation, and networks in IAT research. It is crucial that we continue to consider 
how cognition both responds to and helps to produce the scripts and schemas available in a 
particular cultural environment. But creating a bridge requires building from both ends. We 
believe that cognitive psychologists can also contribute. 
 The most fruitful insights will come from interdisciplinary dialogue at the intersection of 
group-level repertoires and universal cognitive processes. In the study of poverty, cultural 
sociologists can build on existing cognitive research to investigate the scripts, schemas, and 
frames that may lead poor people in specific contexts to prioritize scarce resources in diverse 
ways (e.g., Daniel 30; Rao 23; Sanyal 75). Cognitive psychologists can improve research designs 
with broader questions about the meaning and valuation of scarce resources (e.g., Srivastava and 
Banaji 76). DPM scientists should incorporate findings from the sociology, anthropology, and 
cultural psychology of morality to study how repertoires structure moral intuitions or reflection. 
IAT researchers could better interpret test results by incorporating fine-grained questions about 
exposure and salience in their research design. 
 This paper also serves as a warning concerning the limitations of three lines of cognitive 
research particularly popular among policymakers. Cognitive psychology can enrich our 
understanding of the effects of poverty and the role of individual decisions in reproducing 
inequality. However, poverty cannot be addressed by urging the poor to engage in deliberative 
21 
thinking 77: reducing poverty requires that public policies enhance material redistribution and 
social recognition. Promoting ethical decision-making and resolving moral conflicts will require 
changes in repertoires about morality, rather than shifting modes of cognition 78. Finally, we are 
more likely to address discrimination by gradually changing cultural narratives that stigmatize 
particular groups (e.g., Clair, Daniel, and Lamont 66, on the declining stigmatization of people 
with HIV/AIDS) than by simply sensitizing individuals to their own subconscious biases. 
 Cognition plays an important role in social life. Putting cognition within a broader 
cultural context can help us move beyond the appealing simplicity of individual models and 
address critical social problems of poverty, morality, and discrimination by engaging the 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the three research programs and propositions for future research 
 Cognitive Bandwidth 





Proposition The behaviours of the 
poor are shaped by 
conditions of scarcity 
that tax cognitive 
bandwidth and lead to 
non-optimal decisions. 
We have two modes of 
cognition, automatic and 
reflective, that are 
typically associated with 
distinct types of moral 
judgment, deontological 
and utilitarian. 
People have implicit 
biases that can lead to 
discriminatory 
behaviour. IAT unveils 
the implicit biases that 
cannot be captured by 
self-reporting. 
Key texts Mullainathan and Shafir 
2013 18 
Greene 2007 35; 
Cushman and Greene 
2012 79 
Greenwald et al. 1998 55; 








variation in perceptions 
of scarcity, CB presumes 
a natural or inevitable 
prioritization of multiple 
scarce resources. 
By associating automatic 
cognition with 
deontological judgment 
and reflection with 
utilitarian judgment, 
DPM presumes that 
these Western moral 
schemas are universal. 
Without accounting for 
the available cultural 











the cultural repertoires 
that lead to diverse 
perception and 
prioritization of scarce 
resources, CB research 
lacks a causal model for 
understanding the 
behaviour of the poor. 
Without considering the 
diversity of cultural 
repertoires, DPM 
research cannot explain 
observed patterns of 
variation across groups 
or provide reliable 
guidance for resolving 
moral conflicts or 
reducing ethical 
transgressions. 
Without considering the 
cultural repertoires that 
shape ideas about social 
groups, IAT research 
cannot determine 
whether measurable 
biases are evidence of 









CB research can 
incorporate existing 
research on cultural 
repertoires to better 
interpret results; and 
include questions about 
the meaning of multiple 
scarce resources in 
research designs. 
Cultural sociologists can 
extend CB insights by 
investigating the 
meaning and evaluation 
of diverse scarce 
resources. 
DPM research can 
design new moral 
dilemmas based on a 
diverse moral 
discourses; and 
investigate how certain 
schema become 
“intuitive” or the default 
of moral reflection; 
Cultural sociologists can 
elicit and analyse 
people’s explanations of 
their responses. 
IAT research can 
incorporate existing 
research in cultural 
sociology to better 
understand potential 
heterogeneity in results; 
and include questions 




Cultural sociologists can 
consider findings from 
cognitive science to 
better understand 
people’s reaction to 
discriminatory attitudes. 
 
